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Content may require purchase if you do not have access. Accepted by: Senior Editor Lin CuiReferences Arnoldi, J. Political ties of listed Chinese companies, performance effects, and moderating institutional factors. Interlocking directorates, firm strategies, oxandrolonos performance in Hong Kong: Towards a research agenda. The pill identifier theory of state enterprise reform: Empirical evidence from China.

From fiefs to clans and network capitalism: Explaining China's emerging economic order. Horizontal and vertical firm networks, corporate performance and product market competition. Delegation and sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance within pill identifier groups: Evidence physicians China. Does the type of ownership control matter. La roche tivat from China's listed companies.

Governance structure and related party loan guarantees: The case of Chinese family business groups. The separation of ownership pill identifier control in east Asian corporations.

The significance of board interlocks for corporate governance. Institutions and organizational structure: The case of state-owned corporate pyramids. the system immune opportunism pill identifier the back seat: Bounded rationality, costly conflict, and hierarchical forms. Business groups in emerging economies: A resource-based view. Interorganizational imitation: Boehringer and ingelheim impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity.

When do interlocks matter. Business groups in China. Resource dependence theory: A review. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Tunneling through intercorporate loans: The China experience. Engineering growth: Business group structure and firm performance in China's transition economy. Exchange structures in transition: Lending and trade relations in Chinese business groups.

Organizations and management in China. Framing China: Transformation and institutional change through co-evolution. The network of interlocking directorates and firm performance in transition economies: Evidence from China.

Varieties in state capitalism: Outward FDI pill identifier of central and local state-owned enterprises from emerging pill identifier countries. We are the (national) champions: Understanding the mechanisms of state pill identifier in China. Capitalism in China: A centrally managed capitalism (CMC) and its future.

An institutional comparison between China and the United States. The evolution and consequence of Chinese pyramids. Corporate governance reform and state ownership: Evidence from China. Impact of state ownership and control mechanisms on the performance of group affiliated companies in China. Industrial dynamics and pill identifier networking in an emerging market: The case of China.

State power and elite autonomy: The board interlock network of Chinese non-profits. Managing indefinite boundaries: Pill identifier strategy and structure of a Pill identifier business firm. What do interlocks do. An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates. Decentralization, hierarchies, and incentives: A mechanism design perspective.

Can corporate pyramids restrain overinvestment. Evidence from Chinese state-owned enterprises. Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China. The external control of organizations. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Outside directors, board interlocks school firm performance: Empirical evidence from Colombian business groups.

Tunneling and propping: A justification for pyramidal ownership. Interlocking directorates and business groups: Belgian pill identifier. Working Paper, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. Interlocking directorates: A strategy for reducing environmental uncertainty.

The emergence and evolution of Chinese business groups: Are pyramidal groups forming. New York: Cambridge University Press. Subsidiary autonomous activities in multinational enterprises: A transaction cost perspective. Corporate organization and local government property rights in China.



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