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Keywords business groupsChinagovernmentinterlocks Type Article Information Management and Organization ReviewVolume 15Issue 1March 2019pp. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.

Accepted by: Senior Editor Lin CuiReferences Arnoldi, J. Political ties of listed Chinese companies, performance effects, and moderating institutional factors. Interlocking directorates, firm strategies, pussy pain performance in Hong Kong: Towards a research agenda.

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